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ABSTRACT. We study trust games in a virtual world environment and contrast results 
with laboratory studies, with and without personal interaction enabled by the virtual 
world platform. Particular attention is given to the motives that drive behavior in the 
various environments and to issues that are context dependent, particularly 
communication and social distance. We find that allowing for personal interaction 
through a virtual world interface increases the amount sent relative to laboratory results, 
but that subjects recruited in the virtual world give and return less than the laboratory 
control group with the same virtual world interface. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Academic debates on the merits of the laboratory versus the field have contrasted the 
relatively greater control in the lab with the better realism and context of the field (e.g., 
Harrison and List, 2004; Levitt and List, 2007a, 2007b, 2009). The emergence of the 
virtual world as an environment where tens of thousands of residents interact provides a 
possible compromise in that it gives the researcher reasonable control while allowing for 
interaction in an environment familiar to virtual world residents (Bainbridge, 2007; 
Bloomfield, 2007; Castronova, 2001). In particular, it might be useful to replicate known 
experiments in a virtual environment (e.g., Chesney et al., 2007; Spann et al., 2008) while 
taking advantage of environmental features not previously available in laboratory 
experiments (Bainbridge, 2007). A particularly important feature of virtual worlds in our 
view is the ability to have virtual-face-to-virtual-face communication without 
compromising real-world anonymity.  
 We study trust games in such an environment and contrast results with lab studies, 
with and without the virtual world platform. Particular attention is given to issues that are 
context dependent: communication, both personal and impersonal, and social distance as 
measured by group orientation and perceptions. We find that allowing for personal 
interaction through the use of a virtual world interface increases both the amount sent and 
the percentage returned relative to a faceless lab study. We further find that subjects 
recruited in the virtual world give and return less than subjects sitting in the lab and 
interacting through the virtual world interface. Particular attention is given to the motives 
that drive such behavior—including trust, reciprocity, cooperation, and utilitarian 
motives. 
 A persistent state virtual world is a computer-mediated environment which 
simulates the real world, in which human participants interact, but which continues to 
exist independent of the human players (Bloomfield, 2007). In this work, we use a virtual 
world known as Second Life for our experiments. Second Life is not the largest virtual 
world. To date, World of Warcraft is the largest virtual world (for a nice dictator game 
study in World of Warcraft, see Spann et al., 2008). Second Life may be better suited for 
some types of research (Bainbridge, 2007; Bloomfield and Rennekamp, 2008). 
According to Bainbridge (2007), Second Life is especially ideal for experiments in social 
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and cognitive sciences, because the researcher can construct a facility comparable to a 
real-world laboratory and recruit research subjects. Bloomfield (2007) argues that Second 
Life is ideal for research due to its rich economy, naturally evolving markets, and active 
commerce. The first economic study of virtual world economies and markets is by 
Castronova (2001), involving the virtual world of Norrath. At the time, Norrath was the 
most market-oriented virtual environment. Today, Second Life is the most widely 
covered virtual world in the business press, with numerous S&P500 companies, including 
IBM, Sun, and Nike establishing presence online. Other examples of business 
applications in virtual worlds are hotels that allow their customers and business partners 
to walk through the virtual hotel, thus providing useful and inexpensive feedback, 
clothing companies that enable customers to try out clothes and furniture based on their 
avatar’s specifications, as well as intercultural sensitivity simulations (Piller and 
Salvador, 2007).  
Over 150 educational institutions own land, hold events or collaborate in Second 
Life. Companies and universities use it to test concepts and designs, conduct work 
meetings, seminars, lectures, recruiting, advertising and any kind of collaborative 
activity. It has a functioning and active stock exchange and numerous businesses that sell 
virtual and real products and services to residents. Second Life users come from all walks 
of life and are there for various reasons, including socializing and role play. Many of the 
residents spend a sizable portion of their time in the virtual world, own or rent virtual real 
estate and many have virtual jobs.  
According to Linden Lab (2008), of the 500,000 active users 41% are female and 
59% are male. Active users reside in over 100 different countries with approximately 
60% from the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Japan and France, combined. 
The largest age group (34%) of active users is in the 25-34 years old range, but 20% of 
all in-world hours are spent by the people over 45 years old. Thus Second Life offers a 
participant pool with a wider range of demographic characteristics as well as more 
experience with virtual face-to-face communication than the average college student 
subject pool.  
 Virtual worlds are ideally suited to the study of communication and social 
distance since individuals can communicate and conduct interpersonal exchanges in an 
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interactive communication environment. It is possible to create a wide range of verbal 
and nonverbal interpersonal messages which offer more possibilities for sending social 
cues than other electronic communication without compromising anonymity (Biocca, 
1996). There is virtually no academic research on the effects of avatar-based 
communication on strategic behavior in games or comparing lab participants and virtual 
world residents. The purpose of the present work is thus to investigate the effects of 
avatar-based strategically irrelevant cheap-talk communication on behavior in the trust 
game, taking into account the influence of social distance and different subject pools.  
Cheap talk has been shown important for economic behavior—particularly in 
increasing the incidence of cooperative outcomes (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006). Few 
studies look at the impact of strategically irrelevant communication on behavior in games 
and the findings are mixed. Dawes et al. (1977) find hardly any effect, but Roth (1995), 
in bargaining games, Buchan et al. (2006) and Fiedler (2009), in trust games, find that 
strategically irrelevant cheap talk has a positive effect on cooperation. 
 A related line of research concerns anonymity and social distance. Charness and 
Gneezy (2008) show that anonymity can increase selfishness, whereas Dufwenberg and 
Muren (2006) suggest that anonymity may at times reduce selfishness. The main effect of 
anonymity, according to both of these works, is to increase social distance, which in turn 
impacts behavior and preferences towards others. With avatar-based interaction, real-
world anonymity is maintained in that participants do not know the real-world identities 
of those they interact with. Moreover, with participants recruited in the virtual world, 
they are likely to be from geographically distant locations, hence farther increasing social 
distance (Charness et al., 2007).  
In the present study, participants communicate face-to-face, where the faces are 
virtual. To the extent that virtual faces matter, social distance may be reduced. Face-to-
face interaction seems to be important to collaborative interpersonal relationships 
(Jarvenpaa and Leidner, 1999; Nardi and Whittaker, 2002; Nohria and Eccles, 1992; 
O’Hara-Devereaux and Johansen, 1994). Although computer-mediated communication 
leads to higher cooperation levels than no communication, it usually produces weaker 
cooperation than that of face-to-face communication (Bochet et al., 2006; Brosig et al., 
2003; Duffy and Feltovich, 2002; Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1998; Jensen et al., 2000). 
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Other works have argued that computer-mediated communication may help individuals to 
communicate more clearly than face-to-face communication since the interference of 
many stigmatized features can be reduced (Sheeks and Birchmeier, 2007). The concept of 
computer mediated face-to-face interaction via a virtual world may provide a hybrid that 
allows for features from both environments. The present investigation is an important 
first step to assess both subject pool and platform effects of virtual face-to-face 
communication on strategic behavior.  
 
 
 
2. Experimental Design 
 
The game. In the trust game, a first mover-- the proposer-- sends an amount from 
his initial endowment to a second mover—the responder. Any amount not sent to the 
responder is kept by the proposer. The amount sent to the responder is multiplied by 3 
and the responder then chooses an amount to send back to the proposer. Half of the 
participants were designated as proposers and the other half as responders, to be later 
matched in pairs. Both proposers and responders received equal initial endowments. The 
initial endowments are 10 Lab-Euros (4 Lab-Euros = 1 Euro) in the laboratory and 1000 
Linden Dollars in Second Life (374 Linden Dollars=1 Euro).  
Pre-play communication. Prior to playing the trust game, participants first 
engaged in fifteen minutes of pre-play irrelevant communication in groups of three to 
four participants. All communication took place in a Second Life room using avatars and 
text chat. University-recruited subjects were provided with avatars, whereas Second-Life 
recruited subjects brought their own avatars to the experiment. The communication 
process was intended to generate personal interaction of the kind one might experience in 
a virtual community, while maintaining some control over the topics of discussion. To 
examine whether the topics of discussion influence behavior, we allowed for two sets of 
topics—personal and impersonal (see Buchan et al., 2006). Personal topic discussion 
groups were told to introduce themselves, talk about their favorite birthday as a child and 
describe their ideal holiday, among other topics. Impersonal topic discussion groups were 
told to discuss topics concerning general knowledge about the world: to name the most 
populated cities of the world, the highest mountains, or countries that have the highest 
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cost of living according to the United Nations. While these topics are framed as 
impersonal questions, the answers to these questions were discussed by the group in a 
collaborative environment, where group members inevitably disclosed information about 
themselves, although this was monitored and controlled to some extent. During the entire 
communication process, the discussions were observed by monitor avatars. Monitors 
were tasked with ensuring that only the assigned topics were discussed. The specific 
questions for the personal and impersonal treatments are given in appendix A. 
Matching. Following the pre-play communication, participants were matched for 
the trust game in proposer-responder pairs. Matching was anonymous (double-blind) but 
participants were told whether they were matched with a member of their own 
communication group (ingroup) or another communication group (outgroup). The actual 
matching between proposers and responders as well as ingroup and outgroup allocation 
was done via Java Script in combination with PHP Hypertext Preprocessor protocol.  
Interface. To control for experimenter effects as well as to avoid collusion 
between the participants, the trust game in Second Life was played via a web browser. 
The link to the web was implemented via Linden Scripting Language (LSL), which 
allows for self developed programs within objects in Second Life and more specifically 
interoperability between Second Life and the World Wide Web. By clicking on a link in 
Second Life, a web browser opened displaying the web page for the experiment. The web 
page explained the rules of the trust game and indicated to subjects whether they were in 
the role of proposer or responder, and whether they were to be matched with a partner in 
their own communication group (ingroup) or from another communication group 
(outgroup). Neither the participants nor the experimenter knew with whom they were 
matched and all investment decisions were done in private. All data - communication 
treatment, ingroup or outgroup allocation, amount sent and returned as well as all the 
questionnaire data - were saved in a SQL database. After the trust game was over, the 
amount each participant earned was computed and paid to the participant instantly in 
Linden Dollars.  
University Recruited Subjects. A total of 176 university recruited participants took 
part in the experiment. All 176 participants played the trust game with no knowledge of 
the real world identities of the people they interacted with. All the participants were 
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students from the Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich. University participants 
were recruited via website posts, class announcements, and posters and leaflets in the 
different faculties—specifically psychology, informatics, communication science, 
medicine, and law. Of 176 participants, 40 participants played the trust game without 
prior communication. This is condition 1, which we call the No-Communication in the 
Lab condition. The remaining 136 participants were assigned to communication sessions 
in the virtual world of Second Life prior to playing the trust game. This is condition 2, 
which we call the Virtual Pre-play Communication in the Lab condition. The 136 
participants in condition 2 were organized randomly into 45 small discussion groups: 44 
groups of three participants and 1 group of four participants. 
Second Life Subjects. Condition 3 is the Virtual Pre-play Communication by 
Second Life Residents condition. It involves 216 Second Life residents recruited via posts 
in several Second Life forums, blogs, ads and group notices. Individuals sent an email or 
an in-world instant message indicating that they were interested in participating. 
Participants were informed that no critical real world information had to be revealed and 
that it would take approximately 35 minutes to complete the experiment. Participants 
were then scheduled for communication sessions each hour between 9am and 3pm 
(Pacific Standard Time) since this seemed to be the time that was most convenient for the 
majority of the participants from Australia/New Zealand, Europe and North America. 
Participants were asked to be logged into the virtual world five minutes prior to the 
assigned time slot to avoid delay. They then received an invitation either via teleport or a 
landmark that teleported them directly into the assigned communication group. After 
participants arrived they were asked to take a seat and remain silent until the official start 
of the experiment. Communication groups were usually filled within 5 minutes. When 
possible, two communication groups were scheduled for the same time slot. Once 
everyone arrived and took a seat, a standard procedure was employed where the monitor 
avatar asked the participants to open their communication history and to state whether 
they knew anyone in the room. If so, participants were rescheduled. Every participant 
(represented by an avatar) was only allowed to participate once. Participants were told 
they would communicate for 15 minutes on the assigned topics and then asked to make a 
decision as well as to fill out a questionnaire. Participants were asked to text chat for the 
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next 15 minutes about topics posted on the walls of the room where the communication 
took place. After indicating that they understood the instructions they communicated for 
15 minutes.  
Following the completion of the communication session, participants were told to 
click on a positioned script on the table in front of them that led them to the trust game 
interface. After finishing the trust game as well as answering the questionnaire 
participants sent an instant message to us indicating that they are done. They then 
received their earnings in Linden Dollars (which can be instantly converted to Dollars) 
via Second Life pay.  
The 216 participants in the Virtual Pre-play Communication by Second Life 
Residents condition were organized randomly into 72 small discussion groups: one group 
of two participants, 70 groups of three participants and one group of four participants.  
 The demographic composition of the Second Life population is older on average 
than the university-recruited subjects and the nationality of participants in Second Life is 
more heterogeneous. A summary of basic demographic information is shown below: 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
 
3. Results.  
3.1. Actions 
 The dependent variables in our analysis are the amount sent by the proposer to the 
responder and the proportion returned by the responder. We compute the proportion 
returned as the amount responders returned divided by their total wealth- three times the 
amount sent plus the initial endowment.  
The first aspect to note is that the patterns of behavior of university-recruited 
subjects (conditions 1 and 2) are similar to known results. Our No-Communication in the 
Lab condition (condition 1) resulted in proportion sent of 50.5% (std. dev. 29.6%) and 
proportion returned of 34.7% (std. dev. 20.0%). In comparison, in the seminal trust game 
of Berg et al. (1995), the average sent is 53.6% (59.7% in Cox) and the average returned 
is 35% of the amount received. These results have been replicated numerous times with a 
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surprisingly tight range around these proportions (see Camerer, 2003 for an overview of 
replication studies, including cultural differences).  
University-recruited subjects in the Virtual Pre-play Communication in the Lab 
condition (condition 2) sent 74.5% (std. dev. 27.5%) and returned 38.2% (std. dev. 
22.0%). The amount sent is significantly more than the university subjects in the No-
Communication in the Lab condition (condition 1), which sent 50.5%, with a p-value of 
0.001. The proportion returned by university-recruited subjects in the Virtual Pre-play 
Communication in the Lab condition (condition 2) is higher than the No-Communication 
in the Lab condition (condition 1) but not significantly so, with a p-value of 0.52. 
Second Life resident proposers in the Virtual Pre-play Communication by Second 
Life Residents condition (condition 3) send 59% (std. dev. 34.9%). This is significantly 
(p-value of 0.003) less than university-recruited subjects in the Virtual Pre-play 
Communication in the Lab condition, where giving is 74.5%. Second Life resident 
responders in condition 3 return 29.1% (std. dev. 28.6%). This is significantly (p-value of 
0.028) less than university-recruited subjects interacting in the Virtual Pre-play 
Communication in the Lab condition, where the proportion returned is 38.2%. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
 
In the regression reported in the second column of Table 3, money sent by the 
proposer is the dependent variable and the treatments and demographics are explanatory 
variables. The results indicate that university-recruited subjects are different from Second 
Life resident subjects, controlling for gender age and treatment variations, and send a 
greater proportion of their endowment to the responder. Note that motives are not 
included as explanatory variables. This is because motives are presumably determined by 
the other explanatory variables, resulting in endogeneity. We will revisit motives shortly.  
The third column in Table 3 has the proportion returned as the dependent variable 
and treatment variables as well as demographics as the explanatory variables. It shows 
that the subject pool differences are large, controlling for gender and age, and that 
university subjects return a significantly higher proportion than Second Life resident 
subjects. 
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The regression also indicates that ingroup affiliation makes a significant and 
positive difference in the proportion returned by the responders. 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
 
3.2. Motives  
 We established that university-recruited subjects interacting via the virtual world 
interface appear to send and return more than Second Life residents. However, there are 
several motives that could account for the observed behavior. We report some averages 
on a number of other-regarding motives that have been proposed in the literature as 
explanations for observed behavior in the trust game.  
 The first motive we examine is a cooperative sentiment, which could be viewed as 
a proxy for altruism. Subjects were asked to indicate how cooperative they felt towards 
their partners. The second motive is trust in one’s partner. This motive was broken down 
by ingroup and outgroup partners. The third motive is feeling of obligation towards one’s 
partner. Lastly, the utilitarian motive was the subject’s indicated importance for 
maximizing joint earnings. 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
 
For lab proposers, ingroup trust (4.07) was significantly higher than outgroup 
trust (2.88) (p-value<0.001) in a matched pair t-test. For Second Life resident proposers, 
ingroup trust (4.44) was significantly higher than outgroup trust (3.08), with a p-value of 
p<0.001. This despite the fact that money sent is not significantly different for those 
matched with ingroup members and those matched with outgroup members.  
The p-value for matched comparison of ingroup and outgroup trust for lab 
responders is less than 0.001. For Second Life resident responders as well ingroup trust is 
significantly higher than outgroup trust at p<0.001 (matched pair t-test). This is 
Page 12 of 23
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 11 
consistent with the finding that responder’s proportion returned is significantly higher for 
ingroup members.  
Second Life resident responders exhibit significantly more ingroup trust (p-
value=0.004) and more outgroup trust (p-value=0.070) than Responders in the Virtual 
Pre-play Communication in the Lab condition. No other motives in Table 4 exhibit 
significant difference though both Second Life resident proposers and Second Life 
resident responders give higher trust scores than lab subjects. The differences between 
university-recruited and Second Life resident subjects on cooperative, utilitarian and 
obligation sentiments are small and not consistent between roles or motives, suggesting 
that there is likely not much difference there.  
We next estimate, in Table 5, the impact of the various motives on proposer and 
responder choices in the trust game. The amount sent by proposers, in both the lab and 
the field, is increasing in cooperative and utilitarian motives, but not in trust. As 
discussed earlier, the first two motives do not appear different in lab subjects relative to 
the field subjects. Due to the high correlation between the various motives, we also 
examined each motive separately. In that case, trust shows to significantly affect the 
amount sent in both the lab and the field. Given the evidence that the university-recruited 
and Second Life residents (responders more than proposers) might have different levels 
of trust, this could explain the different amounts being sent.  
The proportion returned by responders, in both the lab and the field, is 
significantly increasing only in utilitarian motives. Given that the lab and field are not 
significantly different in levels of utilitarian sentiment, this cannot explain the different 
amounts being sent. Even though ingroup and outgroup trust should not affect responder 
behavior, we checked these as potential explanatory variables and they did not come out 
significant. As a sole explanatory variable, the level of obligation is significant with p-
value=0.03 in Second Life residents but not university-recruited subjects. Hence, it may 
be that the explanation for the differences between the lab and Second Life subjects is 
that the level of obligation-- about the same in both conditions-- is only mapped into 
action in Second Life.  
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Tables 5a + 5b about here 
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4. Conclusions 
There are two possible approaches when using virtual world interfaces for 
artefactual and framed experiments. The first is to bring student subjects to the lab with 
the usual recruiting methods, and to use the virtual world as an interface or platform. The 
second approach, the field approach, is to both recruit the subjects and run the experiment 
in the virtual world.   
  We presented results from trust games conducted in Second Life using both 
approaches as well as a control treatment. This provided us with the ability to assess both 
subject pool and platform effects. We found that the personal interaction enabled by the 
virtual world platform significantly increased the amount sent by proposers.  
The term ―field experiment‖ is still under debate and may mean different things to 
different audiences. We justify our claim to have conducted a ―field experiment‖ by the 
fact that we went to the field (the virtual world), recruited subjects from the field in 
addition to the usual university subject pool, and permitted them to interact in the field as 
they normally would (face-to-face unstructured communication). To the extent that the 
term ―field experiment‖ is still under debate, we hope that this clarifies what we mean by 
it.  
A framework for evaluating the generalizability of lab behavior to the field has 
been proposed by Levitt and List (2007a), building on Harrison and List (2004). The 
framework raises several important aspects for comparison between lab and field. Key 
aspects from that framework in the present context are (1) Scrutiny (2) Anonymity, (3) 
Context, (4) Stakes, and (5) Selection. We find this framework useful for highlighting the 
merits of the present setting. 
Scrutiny. Similar to other experiments that compare field and lab settings, such as 
Gneezy et al. (2004), we find that, controlling for interface effects, participants exhibit 
considerably higher levels of trusting behavior in the lab than in the field, even though 
field participants report higher levels of trust in the questionnaire than lab participants. 
Levitt and List (2007a) suggest that scrutiny will exaggerate the importance of pro-social 
behaviors relative to environments with less scrutiny. Even though we applied the same 
kind of monitoring in the lab and the field (a monitor avatar was present in the virtual 
room during all experimental communication sessions) and the final decision was made 
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in private, we believe that the moral costs of non-social behavior are higher in the lab 
than in the field since participants know that the monitors are within spatial proximity 
whereas in the field experiments, the monitors might be located in a different city, 
country or even on a different continent.  
Anonymity. In laboratory experiments, the issue of anonymity has long dominated 
the discussion of experimental design. Hoffman et al. (1994, 1996) implemented a 
double-blind experimental procedure allowing for anonymity between experimenter and 
participants. They found that donation amounts drastically dropped with the double blind 
procedure.  List et al. (2004) found similar results in public good giving. Davis and Holt 
(1993, 269) note that such results "indicate that this apparent generosity is not altruism, 
but rather seems to arise largely from concerns about opinions of outside observers."  
Anonymity can be broken down to three aspects: anonymity relative to other 
participants, anonymity relative to the experimenter, and reputation formation. In the 
experiments discussed in the present work, care was taken to maintain a degree of 
anonymity in all three dimensions. While the conversation phase involved no virtual-face 
anonymity, the decision making phase was done through privately viewed windows with 
the matching of proposer and responder done so as to prevent perfect identification of 
one’s partner. Specifically, participants conversed in groups of three and were randomly 
assigned as proposer and responder knowing only whether they were matched with 
someone from their own group (but not with whom exactly). Since the decisions were 
done in private on a website and the matching was done via a computerized database, 
anonymity with respect to the experimenter was maintained as well. Lastly, interactions 
were one-shot in order to avoid reputation formation.  
Anonymity between subjects regarding their true (non-virtual-world) identity was 
also largely maintained. In Second Life, avatars’ real-world owners remained 
anonymous. Lab participants used standard avatars that were generated for the 
experiment and then disposed of. Anonymity is, however, reduced in the virtual setting 
due to the pre-play communication. The evidence is that lab subjects with Second Life 
avatars greatly alter their behavior. Haley and Fessler (2005) find that dictator game 
giving increases when a pair of eyes is shown on the screen. In our case, this pair of eyes 
is accompanied by a face and a body, so in that sense anonymity decreases.   
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Context. Another crucial difference between the lab and the field is context. As 
Harrison and List (2004) and Levitt and List (2007a) point out, social norms can be 
extremely sensitive to context. The environment, including furniture arrangement and 
décor may influence behavior (Harrison and List, 2004). We tried different room decors 
in Second Life but found no significant effect. Nevertheless, the physical characteristics 
of the environment are much more easily manipulated in virtual worlds and this is 
perhaps an avenue for future research (see Atlas and Putterman, 2009). List (2006) found 
that sports card dealers behaved in the lab in a manner very similar to university-recruited 
subjects. But they behaved very differently in their natural field. To the extent that our 
Second Life subjects felt that the controlled environment we placed them in resembled 
their ―natural habitat‖ (was less artificial than either the laboratory or the Second Life 
setting would seem to the typical university subject), this might account for the results we 
observed. More relevant for the present investigation is the task itself. Pre-play 
communication for laboratory subjects may feel forced, as subjects arrive for an 
experiment—not a chatting exercise. In Second Life, subjects’ primary in-world activity 
is social interaction. The communication tools are familiar and natural and the 
conversation flows freely. As such, a study of pre-play communication has a much more 
natural feel to it in Second Life.        
Stakes. High stakes are generally known to reduce social considerations (Slonim 
and Roth, 1998; Parco et al., 2002). In the present setting, while the dollar incentives 
were the same between the lab and Second Life, they were considered high relative to 
wages in Second Life. This might be partially responsible for the less social behavior 
observed by Second Life subjects relative to the university recruited subjects interacting 
in a Second Life platform.  
Selection. There is some research (see reviews in Harrison and List, 2004 and 
Levitt and List, 2007a) to indicate that university subjects may be different than the 
population at large and may be more prone to seek social approval. The population we 
accessed in our Second Life experiments is more diverse in age, nationality and 
occupation than our university population. Furthermore, the emphasis in Second Life on 
profit-making and entrepreneurial behavior may create a self-selection of subjects that are 
less likely to be benevolent.  
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Virtual worlds such as Second Life may offer more realism than the laboratory 
because social interactions and economic exchanges in these worlds can be observed in 
settings that are familiar and natural to residents. Desirable aspects, in terms of the 
framework we just discussed, include richer context, relatively higher stakes (compared 
to in-world earning power) and selection diversity relative to homogenous student 
populations. The above framework also points to a loss of control, relative to the 
laboratory, in terms of reduced levels of scrutiny and anonymity. Nevertheless, virtual 
worlds enable the experimenter to exert a higher degree of control over the experimental 
environment than many non-virtual field settings. Virtual worlds such as Second Life 
allow for screening and blocking of participants, double-blind procedures, randomization 
regarding recruitment and matching of participants and identification of IP addresses and 
participating client names (see Bloomfield and Rennekamp, 2008, and Atlas, 2008, for an 
overview on possible measures to exercise control in virtual world experiments). An 
added benefit in terms of control is that field experiments in virtual worlds lend 
themselves to relatively easy replication in terms of protocol (Levitt and List, 2009). 
It is important to stress that findings with virtual world participants may not be 
seamlessly extrapolated to other economic settings (Levitt and List, 2007a). Also, as in 
any internet-based research endeavor, measures such as running double-blind procedures, 
ensuring that participants believe that they are matched with a real person, appeals 
directed to the honesty and fairness of the participants, requiring a certain experience, 
collecting IP addresses and guaranteeing an anonymous data analysis and strict 
confidentiality are helpful in reducing problems associated with self-reported measures 
and playing the game more than once but are no guarantee for eliminating them 
(Anderhub et al., 2001; Drehmann et al., 2005, 2007; Eckel and Wilson, 2006).  
In the search for the ideal experimental environment, there is an inherent tradeoff 
between control and realism, where the laboratory is advantaged in the former and the 
field is advantaged in the latter. A middle of the road between the lab and the field may 
be found in virtual world experiments, which provide both limited realism and a 
considerable measure of control. It is important to stress that the increased realism of 
virtual world relative to the lab comes from the participants’ familiarity and everyday 
experience with social interaction in virtual worlds. Without that familiarity and 
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experience, virtual world communication is no more realistic than computerized 
communication in the lab-- much as an internet auction is no more realistic than a 
laboratory auction to someone uninitiated with such a platform.  
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Appendix A. Discussion Questions for Interaction in Second Life 
 
Personal Topics 
 
1) Each person in the group should introduce themselves and say what school they 
attend/attended, what year they are or were in school, and what day is their birthday. 
 
2) Each person in the group should tell about their favorite birthday when they were a 
child. 
 
3) Each person in the group should tell how they would normally celebrate their birthday 
with their family. 
 
4) Each person in the group should explain what their ideal birthday celebration would be. 
 
5) Each person in the group should explain what their favorite holiday looks like. 
 
 
 
Impersonal Topics 
 
1) What are the ten most populated cities in the world? 
2) As recorded by the United Nations, what five countries have the highest cost of living 
in the world? 
3) Using both the Fahrenheit and Celsius (Centigrade) Scales: 
 A) What is the boiling point of water? 
 B) What is the freezing point of water? 
 C) What temperature is absolute zero? 
 
4) What country contains the highest mountains in the world?   Name them? 
5) What 6 countries border Zambia in Southern Africa? 
6) Name 3 countries which refer to their unit of currency as the ―dollar‖? 
 Name 3 countries which refer to their unit of currency as the ―franc‖? 
 Name 3 countries which refer to their unit of currency as the ―peso‖? 
 
7) Estimate the distance in miles or kilometers between Paris and the following world 
cities: 
 
 Paris    ------------ > Hong Kong 
 Paris    ------------ > Sydney 
 Paris    ------------ > Moscow 
 Paris    ------------ > Stockholm 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Basic Demographic Composition 
 Gender 
Age: Mean, 
(std. dev.), 
range 
Country in 
which they 
were at the time 
Second Life 
Participants 
40% males 33 (11), 16-70 
USA:  84 
Europe:  99 
Other: 15 
Unknown: 18  
University 
Recruited 
Participants 
41% males 24 (5), 18-57 Germany: All 
 
Table 2. Subject Choices in the Trust Game 
 N Proportion Sent 
Proportion 
Returned 
Condition 1. 
University-recruited  
participants without 
pre-play 
communication 
 40 50.5 (29.6)  34.7 (20.0) 
Condition 2. 
University-recruited  
participants with 
Second Life interface 
for pre-play 
communication 
136 74.5 (27.5) 38.2 (22.1) 
Condition 3. Second 
Life residents with 
Second Life pre-play 
communication 
216  59.5 (34.9)  29.1 (28.6) 
 
 
Page 22 of 23
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 21 
Table 3. Proposer and Responder Regressions.  
Proportions sent and returned are the dependent variables and treatment and personal 
characteristics are the independent variables. Standard errors are in parentheses.   
 Dependent variable: 
Proportion Sent by 
Proposer 
Dependent variable: 
Proportion Returned 
by Responder 
Intercept 30.826** 
(11.618) 
5.694 
(7.744) 
Personal Communication 5.823 
(4.985) 
2.308 
(3.916) 
Ingroup Partner 0.272 
(4.911) 
8.041** 
(3.952) 
Male 6.659 
(4.985) 
1.938 
(4.069) 
Age 0.694** 
(0.307) 
0.547** 
(0.207) 
University recruited 21.682** 
(5.668) 
12.472** 
(4.418) 
*Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
 
Table 4. Average scores, on a 7-point Likert scale, on other-regarding motives in 
different settings and roles.  
 
Role Setting Cooperative 
Ingroup 
Trust 
Outgroup 
Trust 
Obligated Utilitarian 
Proposer 
Second Life 4.52 4.44 3.08 3.27 4.95 
Lab 4.87 4.07 2.88 2.74 5.13 
Responder 
Second Life 4.88 4.44 3.36 4.33 4.78 
Lab 4.81 3.74 2.91 4.78 4.67 
 
Table 5. Regressions on Motives for Proposers and Responders 
Proportions sent and returned are the dependent variables and treatment and motives are 
the independent variables. Standard errors are in parentheses.   
 
Table 5a. Proposers 
 Lab Proposer 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
Proportion Sent 
Full Regression 
Lab Proposer 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
Proportion 
Sent 
Trust Only 
SL Proposer 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
Proportion 
Sent 
Full 
Regression 
SLProposer 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
Proportion 
Sent 
Trust Only 
Intercept 17.355**      
(8.228) 
52.627**     
(7.615) 
0.284      
(7.292)       
29.244** 
(7.125)       
Page 23 of 23
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 22 
Trust -0.898       
(1.599)    
5.147**     
(1.633)        
1.284      
(1.806)       
8.421** 
(1.790)        
Cooperative 6.391**      
(2.144) 
------- 8.433**     
(1.686)       
------- 
Utilitarian 5.817**      
(1.713) 
------- 3.330**     
(1.513)       
------- 
*Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
 
Table 5b. Responders 
 Lab Responder 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
Proportion Sent 
 
SL Responder 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
Proportion Sent 
 
Intercept 15.030*   
(7.708)        
0.654 
(7.346) 
Obligated -0.825    
(1.506)       
2.401 
(1.433) 
Cooperative 1.138    
(1.743)       
-0.628  
(1.711) 
Utilitarian 4.624**  
(1.508)        
4.418** 
(1.389) 
*Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
 
 
 
 
